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“Sink or Swim Together”: How the Recent Challenge to California’s
Fuel Regulations Could Have Wide-Reaching Effects
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey1
Patrick Logan

I. INTRODUCTION
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union deals with an issue that has been in
litigation for many years.2 In an effort to curb greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions, the California legislature has passed regulations covering the sale
of crude oil and ethanol-based fuels within the state. Fuel producers outside
of the state filed suit, claiming that the regulations were unconstitutional
under the dormant Commerce Clause. The Ninth Circuit disagreed and
declined the invitation to strike down the fuel regulations that California had
established.
The Ninth Circuit’s holding did not end the debate, as the dissenting
justices were glad to point out. The fuel regulations still must survive
analysis by the district court under the guidelines set by the Ninth Circuit.3
Though there are valid legal arguments both for and against this type of
regulation, we should also take a step outside of the law and consider the
practical realities facing California and, indeed, the rest of the world.
Climate change is a serious, global issue that is unique to our modern day
way of life. For this reason, the fate of California’s fuel regulations is
important for the future of every state in the Union.

1

730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013).
See Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1086. Rocky Mt. Farmers Union first filed
suit in 2009. Id.
3
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1077-78.
2
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Clean Air Act (“CAA”) prohibits individual state regulation of
motor vehicle emissions for new cars.4 However, Congress made an
exception in the act allowing California to adopt its own standard of
regulation.5 Pursuant to the authority granted them by the CAA, the
California legislature enacted Assembly Bill 32 (aptly named the “Global
Warming Solutions Act”).6 The bill empowered the California Air Resources
Board (“CARB”) to design regulations intended to return the state’s GHG
emissions to their 1990 level by the year 2020.7 Transportation emissions are
the state’s single largest source of GHG emissions,8 so CARB designed a
three-part approach to lowering GHG emissions from the transportation
sector specifically.9 CARB’s approach was to “reduce emissions at the
tailpipe by establishing progressively stricter emissions limits for new
vehicles,” reduce the number of “vehicle miles traveled” per year, and
establish a new fuel standard “to reduce the quantity of GHGs emitted in the
production of transportation fuel.”10
The fuel standard applies to nearly all transportation fuels consumed
in California currently, as well as any future fuel that may be developed.11
CARB’s standard works by requiring fuel blenders to keep the average
carbon intensity of their total fuel volume below the standard’s annual limit.12
A blender’s product generates either credits or deficits, depending on whether
4

42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2014).
42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2014) (“The Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for
public hearing, waive application of this section to any State which has adopted standards
(other than crankcase emission standards) for the control of emissions from new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, if the State determines
that the State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and
welfare as applicable Federal standards.”).
6
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1079.
7
Id.
8
Id. Transportation emissions account for more than 40% of the state’s total GHG
emissions. Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 1080.
12
Id. at 1079 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95482(a) (2011).).
5
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the average carbon intensity is higher or lower than the annual cap.13 A fuel
blender can purchase credits from other blenders, allowing them to comply
with the carbon intensity cap despite having a deficit for the year.14 When
implementing the fuel standard, CARB created a market to facilitate the
buying and selling of credits between producers.15 This market was expected
to encourage fuel blenders to develop fuels with lower carbon intensities for
use in California, wherever the blenders were located.16
In order to determine a fuel’s total carbon intensity, the fuel standard
used a “lifecycle analysis.”17 This analysis took into account emissions that
were generated during “all aspects of the production, refining, and
transportation of a fuel, with the aim of reducing total, well-to-wheel GHG
emissions.”18 After the total emissions were calculated, CARB assigned a
fuel’s lifecycle a “cumulative carbon intensity value,” which they referred to
as a “pathway.”19 CARB calculated a number of “default pathways” based
on a modified version of the Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and
Energy Use in Transportation Model.20 The default pathways were separated
into regional categories.21 These regional categories were California, the
Midwest, and Brazil.22 Even though CARB’s default pathways were
separated by region, the total carbon intensity is what determined the value of
those pathways, not the fuel’s location of origin.23 Fuel blenders can choose
to either rely on one of these default pathways when reporting their GHG
emissions, or they can register an individualized pathway based on one of
two methods.24 The first method is to rely on part of a default pathway, but

13

Id. at 1080 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95485(a) (2011).).
Id. (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 § 95485 (2011).).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 1081.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 1082.
21
Id. at 1110; see also Appendix 1.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 1089.
24
Id.
14
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substitute some of the pathway’s average values for their own.25 The second
is to propose an entirely new pathway altogether.26
The fuel standard regulates both crude oil27 and ethanol.28 In 2011,
CARB chose to incentivize the production of alternative fuels over crude
oil.29 The provisions passed in 2011 mandated that “no crude oil could be
assessed a carbon intensity below the market average, but newer sources
causing higher emissions were assessed at their individual carbon
intensity.”30 This meant that a fuel blender could only meet the fuel
standard’s carbon intensity requirements by selling alternative fuels or
buying credits to cover their deficits.31 CARB later amended the provisions
to assess carbon intensity of crude oil fuels based on “either the average of
the California market in the year of sale or the average from 2010, whichever
is higher.”32
In December 2009, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union et al. (“Rocky
Mountain”) challenged the fuel standard’s ethanol provisions.33 Their
complaint alleged that the ethanol provisions violated the dormant Commerce
Clause and were preempted by the federal Renewable Fuel Standard.34 They
sought a preliminary injunction.35 Then, in February 2010, American Fuels
& Petrochemical Manufacturers Association et al. (“American Fuels”)
separately challenged both the ethanol and crude oil provisions on similar
grounds.36 American Fuels moved for summary judgment on the Commerce

25

Id.
Id.
27
Id. at 1084.
28
Id. at 1083.
29
Id. at 1085.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
26
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Clause claim.37 CARB responded by filing cross-motions for summary
judgment on all grounds.38
The district court granted Rocky Mountain’s request for a preliminary
injunction and American Fuel’s motion for summary judgment.39 They
concluded that CARB’s fuel standard “violated the dormant Commerce
Clause by (1) engaging in extraterritorial regulation, (2) facially
discriminating against out-of-state ethanol, and (3) discriminating against
out-of-state crude oil in purpose and effect.”40 The district court also found
that CARB failed to show that the Fuel Standard survived strict scrutiny.41
The court did grant partial summary judgment for CARB, stating that the
Fuel Standard was a permissible “control or prohibition respecting a
characteristic or component of fuel under section 211(c)(4)(B) of the
CAA.”42 However, they disagreed with CARB that the CAA prevented
scrutiny of the Fuel Standard under the Commerce Clause.43
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Fuel
Standard’s regulation of ethanol and crude oil did not facially discriminate
against out-of-state commerce.44 They further held that the Fuel Standard did
not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.45 The Ninth Circuit vacated the
injunction and remanded the case to the district court.46 On remand, the
district court must determine if the ethanol provisions are discriminatory “in
purpose or practical effect.”47 If they are, the court must apply strict scrutiny
to those provisions.48 If not, the court still must determine whether the Fuel

37

Id.
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 1078.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
38
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Standard imposes a burden on interstate commerce “that is ‘clearly
excessive’ in relation to its local benefits.”49
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1957, California began statewide efforts to regulate GHG
emissions.50 When Congress began instituting federal regulation, they
looked to California’s efforts as a guide.51 The 1977 revisions to the Clean
Air Act prohibited state regulation of GHG emissions from motor vehicles,52
but Congress carved out an exception for California.53 Over the auto
industry’s objections,54 California’s standards were established as the only
alternative to federal clean air standards.55
Any valid state regulation cannot violate the Constitution. The
Commerce Clause allows Congress “[t]o regulate commerce. . . among the
several States.”56 While the express terms of the Commerce Clause do not
restrain the states, courts have read in a negative implication.57 What this
means is that modern legal theorists consider it to be the framer’s intent that
the Commerce Clause should “prevent a state from retreating into economic

49

Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1109 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
51
Id. at 1110.
52
Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2014) (“No State or any political subdivision thereof shall
adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part.”).
53
42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (“The Administrator shall, after notice and opportunity for public
hearing, waive application of this section to any State which has adopted standards (other
than crankcase emission standards) for the control of emissions from new motor vehicles
or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, if the State determines that the
State standards will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public health and
welfare as applicable Federal standards.”).
54
Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n, 627 F.2d at 1101 (holding that waiving federal regulation
for California was not “arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
55
42 U.S.C. § 7507.
56
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
57
Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337 (2008) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3).
50
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isolation.”58 This theory has become known as the “dormant Commerce
Clause.”59
Under a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, a court must ask
whether the “challenged law discriminates against interstate commerce.”60
Courts distinguish between laws which “affirmatively discriminate” against
interstate commerce and laws which “burden interstate transactions only
incidentally.”61 A law can affirmatively discriminate against interstate
commerce “either on its face or in practical effect.”62 If either condition is
shown, the court must apply strict scrutiny to the law. 63 A discriminatory
law survives strict scrutiny only if it “advances a legitimate local purpose that
cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”64
However, if the law’s effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, the
court uses a lower standard. The Supreme Court held in Pike v. Bruce
Church that in such a case, the law will be upheld “unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits.”65
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that California’s regulation of ethanol and crude oil did not facially
discriminate against out-of-state commerce.66 Furthermore, the Fuel
Standard did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.67 The Court of
Appeals also found that the district court erred in its determination that the
regulation of crude oil was discriminatory in purpose and effect under the
58

Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 179-80 (1995).
Davis, 553 U.S. at 337.
60
Id. at 338.
61
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986).
62
Id. (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979)).
63
Id. (citing Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336).
64
Id. (citing Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336).
65
Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see also Sporhase v.
Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982)).
66
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013).
67
Id.
59
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Commerce Clause.68 Finally, the Court of Appeals determined that the Fuel
Standard was subject to scrutiny under the Commerce Clause and not
insulated from scrutiny by the CAA.69 The case was remanded to the district
court to consider whether or not the ethanol regulations “discriminate in
purpose or effect and, if not, to apply the Pike balancing test,” as well as to
apply the Pike balancing test to the crude oil regulations.70
Plaintiffs Rocky Mt. Farmers argued that the Fuel Standard’s
regulation of ethanol and crude oil discriminated against out-of-state
commerce and impermissibly regulated extraterritorial activity.71 Before
answering the question of discrimination, the Court of Appeals first had to
determine which sources of ethanol were similarly situated and, thus, should
be compared.72 Because ethanol from all sources has “identical chemical and
physical properties,” and ethanol from every region could end up blended
together, the court reasoned that all sources of ethanol should be compared.73
The court also concluded that GHG emissions generated from the electricity
used in the creation process, the efficiency of the plants which produced the
ethanol, and the transportation of both the ethanol and feedstock used to
produce the fuel were all relevant factors to consider, regardless of the
location of the ethanol producer.74 This is because “[a]ll factors that affect
carbon intensity are critical to determining whether the Fuel Standard gives
equal treatment to similarly situated fuels.”75
Taking all of these factors into account, the Court of Appeals
determined that CARB’s fuel standard did not impermissibly discriminate
based on origin.76 Rather, fuels were regulated based on their carbon
intensity.77 A fuel’s origin was relevant to the lifecycle analysis “only to the
68

Id.
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 1086.
72
Id. at 1088.
73
Id. (quoting Rocky Mt. Ethanol, 843 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1081 (quoting ISOR V-30)).
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1089.
76
Id.
77
Id.
69
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extent that location affects the actual GHG emissions attributable to a default
pathway.”78 The fuel standard did not protect California producers from
outside competition.79 On the contrary, the pathways from the Midwest and
Brazil actually have the lowest carbon intensity values, demonstrating that
there is no preferential treatment for California producers.80
Plaintiffs further argued that considering emissions from the
transportation of feedstocks used in the creation of ethanol and the fuel itself
was forbidden.81 The Court of Appeals disagreed. The Fuel Standard did not
isolate local Californian ethanol producers from the rest of the world; the
transportation factor was applied evenly to all pathways, regardless of
origin.82 Plaintiffs also argued that GHG emissions from electricity are
“inextricably intertwined with geography” and, therefore, an impermissible
discrimination.83 Midwest producers, who largely located their plants near
carbon-intensive, coal-fired electrical plants, claimed their location adversely
affected their pathway, discriminating against them over California
producers.84 However, the Court of Appeals stated that “the dormant
Commerce Clause does not guarantee that ethanol producers may compete on
the terms they find most convenient.”85 Ethanol producers could find
alternative means of power generation.86 In fact, some ethanol producers in
the Midwest generated their own power, reducing their GHG emissions.87
The court also concluded that the Fuel Standard did not eliminate any
economic advantages that out-of-state producers had earned for themselves.88
Midwest producers had access to cheap energy from coal-fired electrical
plants because of their close proximity to those plants, but that cheap
electricity was not “earned” by Midwest Producers.89 It was actually the
78

Id.
Id. at 1090.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 1091.
82
Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 US 137, 145(1970)).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 1092.
86
Id. at 1091.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 1092.
89
Id.
79
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Midwest producers who generated their own power that earned benefits
which were recognized through the lifecycle analysis.90
Plaintiffs also challenged the fuel standard on the grounds that it
discriminated based solely on origin by using regional averages for its default
pathways.91 The court reasoned that CARB gave equal treatment to all
regions.92 Carbon intensity values were not assigned based on a fuel’s “outof-state character.”93 Rather, a fuel’s carbon intensity was measured
according to the same model regardless of its origin.94 CARB’s pathway
scheme may have burdened or benefited certain producers, but it did so
evenhandedly to both California and Midwest producers.95 The court
attributed this to “the imprecision of averages rather than to
discrimination.”96 The fact that the boundaries of the regional categories
were set at the California state line was not fatal to the fuel standard.97
Individual inspection of every pathway was deemed “unreasonably
costly[,]”98 but the regional boundaries were not arbitrary. For example,
almost every producer of corn ethanol was located in California or Brazil.99
In order for corn from the Midwest to reach California so that it could be
processed into ethanol by California producers, it had to pass over the Rocky
Mountains, raising GHG emissions from transportation.100 The resulting
total carbon intensity of ethanol produced in California is higher than ethanol
produced in Brazil, which has much lower GHG emissions from
transportation.101 Therefore, it would have made little sense to place
Californian corn ethanol in the same regional average as Midwestern or
Brazilian corn ethanol.102
90

Id.
Id. at 1093.
92
Id. at 1094.
93
Id. at 1096.
94
Id. at 1082 (internal citations omitted).
95
Id. at 1094.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 1095.
99
Id. at 1096. The only registered producer of corn ethanol elsewhere was in Idaho. Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
91
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The Court of Appeals also found that the 2011 provisions which
regulated crude oil were not analyzed properly by the district court.103 The
court first examined the legislature’s intent and found that there was no
protectionist purpose in enacting the 2011 provisions.104 Since there was no
protectionist purpose, the district court should have determined whether or
not the 2011 provisions created an adverse effect.105 Plaintiffs did not
present “substantial evidence” of a discriminatory effect, so the Court of
Appeals remanded the claim with instructions for the district court to
examine it under the Pike balancing test.106
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the fuel standard did not
violate the dormant Commerce Clause by regulating out-of-state
commerce.107 The fuel standard did not impose any conditions explicitly on
ethanol which was produced out-of-state.108 Rather than regulating out-ofstate producers directly, the fuel standard regulated “contractual relationships
in which at least one party is located in [the regulated state].”109 “California
may regulate with reference to local harms, structuring its internal markets to
set incentives for firms to produce less harmful products for sale in
California.”110 The fuel standard did not regulate any transactions outside of
California; it only imposed requirements that out-of-state producers had to
meet before selling their product within the state.111
The brief dissenting opinion focused on the question of the facial
discrimination of the ethanol regulations.112 The dissent stated that because
the text of the fuel standard differentiated between in-state and out-of-state

103

Id. at 1100.
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 1100-01 (quoting Black Star Farms, LLC v. Oliver, 544 F.Supp.2d 913, 928
(D.Ariz. 2008); citing Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970)).
107
Id. at 1101 (citing Haley v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
108
Id. at 1102.
109
Id. at 1103 (quoting Gravquick A/S v. Trimble Navigation Int’l Ltd., 323 F.3d 1219,
1224 (9th Cir. 2003); (citing Healy, 491 U.S. at 343)).
110
Id. at 1104.
111
Id. at 1102-03.
112
Id. at 1107-08 (Murguia, J., dissenting).
104
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ethanol, the fuel standard was a facially discriminatory regulation.113
Applying strict scrutiny to the provisions, the dissent believed that there were
“reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives” to reducing GHG emissions,
even if the alternative “is more difficult or costly to implement.”114
V. COMMENT
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Rocky Mt. Farmers Union should
encourage state legislatures to pursue regulations designed to limit GHG
emissions within their borders and reassure them that any such efforts will
not be struck down as unconstitutional. For this reason alone, the opinion
should be viewed as a victory for environmental activists. That being said, it
remains to be seen whether CARB’s regulatory scheme will ultimately be
upheld.
An increase in global temperatures is a real problem facing the world
today. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) defines
climate change as “a change in the state of the climate that can be identified
(e.g. using statistical tests) by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its
properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically decades or
longer.”115 The IPCC states that it is “unequivocal” that average
temperatures have risen globally.116 Temperature increases have been much
greater at northern latitudes.117 The average arctic temperature “has
increased at almost twice the global rate in the past 100 years.”118 Since
1961, both the average global surface temperature and average sea level have
steadily risen, while snow cover in the northern hemisphere has decreased.119
Climate change could have a serious impact around the world. The
risk of coastal erosion is expected to increase, and “many millions more
113

Id. at 1108.
Id. at 1109.
115
Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
30 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 31.
114
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people than today are projected to experience floods every year due to sea
level rise.”120 There will likely be an increase in storm surges along the
coasts, more frequent and intense heat waves, and an increased number of
wildfires.121 Poor communities, coastal industries, and communities that rely
economically on “climate-sensitive resources” will be the most vulnerable,122
but decreasing availability of freshwater resources will affect all regions.123
Though it is true that there are some natural explanations for climate
change, the rise in GHG levels has been directly linked to rising
temperatures.124 GHGs “affect the absorption, scattering and emission of
radiation within the atmosphere and at the Earth’s surface.”125 GHGs, like
the carbon dioxide emitted during the burning of fossil fuels, absorb energy
and “act like a blanket, making Earth warmer than it would otherwise be.”126
The IPCC claims that between 1970 and 2004, the largest increase in GHG
emissions came from “energy supply, transport and industry.”127 Significant
for our purposes, the IPCC further states that the global increase in carbon
dioxide levels is “due primarily to fossil fuel use.”128
Rising GHG emissions are a global problem, but the majority opinion
in Rocky Mt. Farmers Union correctly states that California has a heightened
interest in the GHG emissions produced outside of its borders.129 “With its
long coastlines vulnerable to rising waters, large population that needs food
and water, sizable deserts that can expand with sustained increased heat, and
vast forests that may become tinderboxes with too little rain, California is
120

Id. at 48.
Advancing the Science of Climate Change, Division of Earth & Life Studies of the
National Academies 1-2 (2010), http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static-assets/materialsbased-on-reports/reports-in-brief/Science-Report-Brief-final.pdf.
122
Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, supra note 115, at 48.
123
Id. at 49.
124
Id. at 36-37.
125
Id. at 37.
126
Causes of Climate Change, U NITED S TATES E NVIRONMENTAL P ROTECTION
A GENCY , http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/causes.html (last visited May
7, 2015).
127
Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, supra note 115, at 48.
128
Id. at 37.
129
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1090 (9th Cir. 2013).
121
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uniquely vulnerable to the perils of global warming.”130 Taking this reality
into account, the majority did not want to handicap California’s efforts to
combat global warming. Stating that the dormant Commerce Clause is not a
“blindfold,” the majority made clear that in addition to examining the law,
they also based their holding on the practical realities facing our planet
today.131 The majority was hopeful that, if successful, CARB’s regulations
would “help ease California’s climate risks and inform other states as they
attempt to confront similar challenges.”132 But did the majority go too far
outside of the law in this case?
While CARB’s regulations were aimed only at fuels sold within
California’s borders, one cannot dispute that they will affect how out-of-state
producers act.133 In fact, the regulations are intended to affect the behavior of
out-of-state producers, and CARB acknowledged that the regulations would
“reduce the volume of fuels that are imported from other states.”134 The
dissent argued that this is exactly the kind of economic regulation that
Supreme Court precedent was intended to abolish. However, Justice Gould,
the author of the Ninth Circuit’s majority opinion, interprets precedent as
only prohibiting California from regulating “wholly out-of-state
transactions.”135 In his view, a state may regulate commerce within its
borders even if the goal of such regulation is to influence out-of-state choices
made by producers.136 Justice Gould’s interpretation won the day, and based
on the Ninth Circuit’s extensive review of the facts, it is difficult to imagine
the district court striking down the Fuel Standard on remand.137 But if the
Supreme Court decided to take up the issue, how might they interpret their
130

Id. at 1106.
Id. at 1107.
132
Id.
133
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 517 (9th Cir. 2014) (denying
petitioner’s motion for rehearing).
134
Id.
135
Id. at 512.
136
Id.
137
Shelly Welton, Ninth Circuit Rejects Constitutional Challenge to California’s Low
Carbon Fuel Standard, Climate Law Blog (Sept. 19, 2013),
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2013/09/19/ninth-circuit-rejectsconstitutional-challenge-to-californias-low-carbon-fuel-standard/.
131
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own precedent?
There is case law supporting Justice Gould’s
interpretation,138 but the answer is far from clear.
If the fuel standard had been held unconstitutional, there is the
possibility that a nondiscriminatory means of reaching the same result could
exist. In the lower court opinion, which was reversed and remanded by the
Ninth Circuit, Judge Lawrence O’Neill suggested a “tax on fossil fuels” as a
nondiscriminatory means to reducing GHG emissions.139 However, it is
doubtful that an increased tax on gasoline is currently politically feasible. A
ruling by the Supreme Court that CARB’s ethanol and crude oil regulations
are unconstitutional could essentially be a death sentence for CARB’s fuel
standard and prevent other states from enacting their own regulatory
schemes. If the Supreme Court overturned the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
CARB’s ability to meet their GHG emission goals would be severely limited.
More importantly, there could be serious damage done to the environment if
the Court ignored the reality that all aspects of fuel production must be
scrutinized to effectively reduce GHG emissions.
Transportation is the largest source of GHG emissions in California,
making up 37.6 percent of California’s “emission inventory” in 2011.140 Of
all methods of transportation, on-road vehicles are the greatest
contributors.141 After the California legislature enacted the “Global Warming
Solutions Act of 2006” and the governor issued his executive order directing
CARB to reduce GHG emissions attributable to the fuel market,142 GHG
emission levels from on-road transportation dropped dramatically. Between
2007 and 2008, emissions dropped by 5.9 percent and have continued to
decrease over time.143 The data shows that ever since CARB was directed to
138

See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2003).
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1093-1094 (E.D. Cal.
2011).
140
California Environmental Protection Agency Air Resources Board, California
Greenhouse Gas Emission Inventory: 2000 – 2012, i, 23 (May 2014),
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inventory/pubs/reports/ghg_inventory_00-12_report.pdf.
141
Id. at i.Over 90 percent of total emissions from the transportation sector come from
on-road vehicles. Id.
142
Rocky Mt. Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1080 (9th Cir. 2013).
143
California Greenhouse Gas Emission Inventory: 2000 - 2012, supra note 140, at 11.
139
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regulate fuel emissions in 2007, there has been a significant impact in the
amount of GHG emissions from on-road transportation.
The dissenting Justices on the Ninth Circuit eagerly pointed to the
admission by CARB that their regulatory scheme will have “little to no effect
in averting the environmental catastrophe” posed by global warming.144
While it’s true that CARB’s regulations will not single-handedly stem the
tide of increasing GHG emissions, the data proves that the regulations do
have an effect. Justice Gould reminded the dissent “that incremental change,
when aggregated, can be significant.”145 Furthermore, he was hopeful “that
successful experimentation by California could lead to broader action by
other states and/or the federal government.”146
Broader action is exactly what is being contemplated in other states,
and their attention is focused on California as they decide how to act.
California is currently the only state to have implemented a low-carbon fuel
standard.147 The state of Washington used CARB’s fuel standard as a basis
for a fuel standard that was evaluated by the Washington Department of
Ecology.148 Additionally, eleven Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states
formed a coalition to develop a low-carbon fuel standard based on
California’s regulations.149 Because CARB’s regulations serve as the
template for other states contemplating regulations of their own, a successful
constitutional challenge to CARB’s Fuel Standard could seriously hinder
current and future efforts to reduce GHG emissions.
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It’s worth keeping in mind the purpose behind the dormant
Commerce Clause. The driving principle behind the theory is that the
Commerce Clause should “prevent a state from retreating into economic
isolation.”150 Writing for the majority in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,151
Justice Cardozo stated “[the Constitution] was framed upon the theory that
the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the
long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”152 When
Justice Cardozo wrote those words in 1935, he could not have foreseen how
relevant they would be to environmental law today. The fuel regulations
instituted by CARB are not an attempt to cut California’s economic ties with
other states, but rather they reflect the growing awareness of the dangers of
rising GHG emissions and the need to react appropriately. California knows
that they cannot resolve the climate change crisis on their own.153 CARB’s
efforts should be seen as a call to arms to other state legislatures. In the spirit
of Justice Cardozo’s words, the states should join together to attack growing
GHG emissions; any single state’s efforts will not be enough standing alone.
VI. CONCLUSION
With their holding in Rocky Mt. Farmers Union, the Ninth Circuit
attempted to encourage states to be proactive in tackling the global problem
of increasing GHG emissions. Legislatures in other states should take the
initiative and follow California’s lead. If fuel regulations are put in place
across the country, producers will have to adapt and we could see a
significant drop in the amount of GHG emissions nationwide. Reducing the
level of GHG emissions means slowing the advance of climate change, which
is a goal that all states, not just California, should share. The Ninth Circuit’s
holding in Rocky Mt. Farmers Union is a step towards advancing that goal,
and the future of CARB’s Fuel Standard will have important implications for
lawmakers across the nation.
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